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MUDDY RULES FOR SECURITIZATIONS
Edward J. Janger*
Securitizations are big business.' In the last decade hundreds of
companies ("Originators") have found it worthwhile to raise capital by
selling publicly issued, asset-backed, debt securities. Instead of issuing
those securities directly, they sell the assets to a separately
incorporated entity (the "issuer" or "special purpose vehicle," or
"SPV") created for the sole purpose of buying and selling specified
assets of the Originator. Market demand for this form of financing
suggests that securitization reduces the cost of capital for many
businesses.
Demand for a product does not necessarily mean,
however, that making it cheaper will be efficient. The efficiency of
these transactions has yet to be established, and serious concerns have
been raised by Lynn LoPucki2 and others.' Notwithstanding concerns
Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School.
1. In 1999, there were $2.5 trillion in asset-backed securities outstanding. See
Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy
Dynamic, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287, 291-92 (2001); see also Lois R. Lupica,
Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory Institutionalization of
Securitization, 33 CONN. L. REv. 199 (2000); Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization:
The Unsecured Creditor'sPerspective, 76 TEx. L. REV. 595 (1998).
2. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 25-26 (1996);
see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing: A Reply to
Professor Schwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REv. 55 (1999). But see Steven L. Schwarcz,
Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEx. L. REv. 515
(1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52
STAN. L. REv. 1 (1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 52
STAN. L. REv. 77 (1999).
3. Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 1, at 597. Lupica states:
Quite a few articles have appeared in the legal and financial journals on the subject
of securitization, and implicit in much of this literature is the message that
securitization transactions are efficient. This literature has invariably viewed these
transactions from the perspective of the originator and the other transaction
participants; its conclusion with respect to the efficiency of securitization is hardly
surprising. The literature has not adequately considered the perspective of third
parties-specifically, the perspective of the originators' unsecured creditors.
Id.; see also Letter from Kenneth Klee on Behalf of the National Bankruptcy
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about efficiency, recent legislative efforts have included special
provisions designed to make securitizations cheaper to accomplish, and
more certain in effect. 4 In this Article, I will argue that these efforts,
in particular the ones proposed for inclusion in Section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code,' are misguided because of a failure by Congress to
appreciate the role of "muddy rules" in deterring inefficient
transactions, and because of a failure to pay proper attention to
considerations of comparative institutional competence.
Part I of this Article will describe securitization transactions and
identify the benefits and risks associated with such transactions. Part II
will describe the proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
contained in Section 912 of the Bankruptcy Reform Bill of 2001, and
the areas of uncertainty that those amendments seek to eliminate. Part
III will explore the role of muddy rules in controlling possible abuses
of securitization transactions. It will argue that the principal muddy
rules which govern securitizations allow judges to sort between
efficient and inefficient securitizations based on potential harm to the
creditors of the Originator. An important second order effect of this
muddiness is that it forces the parties to a securitization transaction to
worry about the effect of the transaction on creditors of the Originator.
Litigation risk serves as a proxy for a seat at the bargaining table.
While the creditors of the Originator are not in the room, the threat of
litigation forces the parties to the securitization are forced to ask what
those creditors would say if they were present. Opponents of muddy
rules often focus on the costs of litigation without acknowledging the
salutary effect that litigation risk may have on transactions, even where
Conference to Senator Herbert Kohl (Aug. 17, 1998), available at
http ://www.law.uchicago.edu/NBC/CurrentPostings/lO5thCongress/hr4393Kohll .pdf
(last visited Mar. 13, 2001).
4. These legislative efforts include proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001); H.R. 333,
107th Cong. § 912 (2001) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001], and the
recently enacted revision to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
contain many new provisions intended both to enhance the certainty of securitization
transactions and to increase the types of assets that could be included in asset backed

securitizations. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-318 (2001); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, The
Impact on Securitization of Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 947 (1999)
("Revised Article 9 attempts to broaden its coverage to virtually all securitized
assets. ").
5. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 4.
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no litigation occurs. Finally, Part IV will show how the proposed
bankruptcy reform eliminates muddiness and judicial sorting just at the
points where it is likely to be most important. Instead, it replaces
judicial sorting with sorting by rating agencies and legal opinion
writers. This substitute for judicial sorting is, on one hand, circular
and, worse yet, where it is not circular, it focuses attention on the
wrong part of the transaction.
I. SECURITIZATIONS

Securitization transactions can be value creating.6 They allow
companies to carve up their asset-backed debt into smaller pieces, and
thereby increase the number of people who can economically lend to
the Originator.7 This may reduce the Originator's cost of capital.8
Securitization transactions can also be rent creating in that they may
benefit the purchasers of the asset-backed securities and the
shareholders of the Originator at the expense of the Originator's
existing creditors. 9
This section explains the mechanics of a
securitization transaction and the ways in which it can be both efficient
and inefficient (while still desirable to the immediate parties to the
transaction).
Imagine, for example, that Originator Manufacturing Company
manufactures widgets. Originator usually sells widgets on credit, and,
as a result, has significant accounts receivable outstanding. In order to
build a new high-speed widget manufacturing facility, Originator wants
to borrow money against those receivables, and wants to do so at as

6.

Steve Schwarcz has described what he calls the alchemy of secured credit.

See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. &
FIN. 133, 142 (1994).

7.

See id. at 134.

8.

Id. at 133; see also TAMAR FRANKEL, SEcuRmZrATION: STRUCTURED
FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991 & Supp.
1994); STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF ASSET SECURrIZATION (2d ed. 1993); Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization
and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1997); Claire A. Hill,
Securitization:A Low-Cost Sweetenerfor Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996).

9.

See LoPucki, Reply to Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 62 ("The gains from

judgment proofing are gains from the externalization of liability."); Lupica, Asset

Securitization, supra note 1, at 597.
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low a cost as possible. In the world before securitization, Originator
had two options. First, it could simply borrow money, using its
receivables as collateral for a secured loan. Second, Originator could
sell the receivables to a factor, who would pay for them, and collect on
them itself. In short, Originator could borrow money or it could sell
assets."°
Both transactions have certain shortcomings from the perspective
of the investor (be it a secured creditor or a factor). The secured
creditor faces a number of risks if the debtor files for bankruptcy."
The automatic stay prohibits any effort to foreclose or otherwise
realize on the collateral. 2 Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code allows
the debtor to use or sell the secured creditor's collateral under certain
circumstances. 3 The rule in the Timbers case deprives undersecured
creditors of interest during the pendency of the case.' 4 Factors, by
contrast, need not concern themselves with Originator's bankruptcy
because the purchased receivables would be excluded from the
bankruptcy estate.' 5 To receive this favored treatment, however, the
factor must actually assume the risks of owning the receivables, and
the Originator must part with the benefits of ownership. Instead of
relying on the credit of the debtor for payment, the factor must rely
exclusively on the creditworthiness of the account debtors, and hope
that the account debtors will not assert defenses on the underlying
obligations. 6 These risks limit the number of investors who can invest
10. For an introduction to the fundamental principles of asset securitization, as
well as the underlying legal and business considerations, see Steven L. Schwarcz,
Structured Finance, A Guide to the Principles of Asset Securitization, PRACTCING
LAW INST. (1993).

11.

See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 6, at 135-36 (stating that SPV "must be

structured as bankruptcy remote" to gain acceptance as an issuer of capital market
securities); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).

12.
13.
14.

See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
See id. § 363.
See United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd.,

484 U.S. 365 (1988).

15. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. The debtor would no longer have a legal or equitable
interest in the asset. Id.
16. Defining the boundaries between sale and loan has bedeviled many
securitizers. See, e.g., Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Rethidcing the Role of Recourse in the
Sale of Financial Assets, 52 Bus. LAW. 159, 159-.63 (1996) (discussing types of
permissible and impermissible recourse for sale treatment); Thomas E. Plank, The
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in the Originator's receivables. Only banks and finance companies,
able to make significant loans and handle the specific risks of the
transaction, are in play.
Securitization seeks to provide a remedy for all of these problems.
Securitization transactions work as follows. First, the Originator
identifies an asset or group of assets that will serve as a basis for
financing, in this case Originator's accounts receivable. Originator
then incorporates a second company, commonly referred to as a
The SPV exists for the sole
Special Purpose Vehicle ("SPV").?
purpose of purchasing accounts from Originator, and issuing securities
against the asset pool. When it works .properly, securitization allows a
company like Originator to raise money more cheaply than by either
borrowing against the receivables or selling them to a factor. This is
because (1) like factoring, the sale of receivables keeps the securitized
assets out of the bankruptcy estate of the Originator if the Originator
fails; (2) unlike either factoring or secured lending, the ability of the
SPV to issue securities makes the investment available to a much wider
range of smaller and less specialized investors; and (3) in order to
enhance the creditworthiness of the SPV, the Originator may agree to
repurchase bad receivables or otherwise cushion the market risk and
credit risk faced by the SPV. " As such, the SPV is treated like a
buyer for upside purposes, but like a secured creditor with recourse
against the debtor if the underlying assets should happen to lose
value.

9

To the extent that securitizations correct an imperfection in the
credit market and thereby reduce the Originator's financing costs, they
True Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 287 (1991).
17.
See Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 6, at 135 ("[A]fter identifying the assets
to be used in securitization, the originator transfers the receivables to a newly formed
special purpose corporation, trust, or other legally separate entity - often referred to
as a special purpose vehicle, or "SPV."); see also Commission on Bankruptcy &
Corporate Reorganization of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Structured
Financing Techniques, 50 Bus. LAW. 527, 588-89 (1995) [hereinafter Structured
Financing Techniques] (defining a special purpose vehicle as "[o]ne or more entities
specially created for structured financing that acquire ownership of the assets to be
securitized and/or issue the asset-backed securities").

18.

See Lupica, Circumvention, supra note 1, at 211 ("Built into every asset

securitization transaction are risk containment measures that have as their primary
focus the quality of the underlying assets.").
19.
See StructuredFinancingTechniques, supra note 17, at 550.
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are beneficial. However, part of the value of securitizations to the
creditor and the debtor may arise because securitizations also shift the
risk of the Originator's insolvency onto the unsecured creditors of the
Originator. 2 Again, this is not problematic if the creditors of the
Originator can adjust the interest rate they charge, or exit the credit, to
respond to the increased riskiness of the investment. But the "market"
on this side of the equation is not perfect either. Existing creditors,
like employees, may not be in a position to leave. Trade creditors and
other small creditors may face a collective action problem, and not be
in a position, individually, to monitor the debtor.2 Therefore, the
trade creditors may calculate interest and payment terms across their
customer base, rather than setting the price based on the Originator's
capital structure.'
Finally, many creditors, such as the taxing
authority and tort claimants, are nonconsensual and cannot adjust the
interest rate they charge because they do not "choose" to enter into the
debtor/creditor relationship with the Originator. 23 Torts and taxes
simply happen.24 Because the credit market is not perfect, this risk
alteration may result in a subsidy to the parties to the securitization
transaction.
Thus, creditors and debtors may wish to engage in securitization
transactions for two distinct reasons. They may wish to benefit from
the market perfecting, value creating attributes of the securitization
transaction, or they may wish to benefit from the risk alteration effects.
It might be useful to think about these two effects of securitizations
respectively as "value creation," and "risk alteration." The danger lies
not in the fact that these two distinct effects exist, but in the fact that
20. See Lupica, Circumvention, supra note 1, at 235 ("A policy carving
securitized assets out of a reorganizing debtor's bankruptcy estate also shifts the risk
of a debtor's bankruptcy away from its largest financier to smaller, more vulnerable
enterprises such as trade creditors, consumers, employees, tort claimants and other
unsecured creditors.").
21. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 881-87 (1996)
(detailing various types of non-adjusting creditors).
22. See id.
23. See Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence
and Statutory Design, 43 Amiz. L. REv. 559, 611 (2001).
24. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 21, at 882-87; see also Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887 (1994); Paul M. Shupack,
Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RurGERS L. Rav. 1067 (1989).
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the immediate parties to a securitization transaction - the shareholders
of and the investors in the SPV - benefit from both the efficiency
enhancing and the efficiency reducing effects of securitization. The
creditors of the SPV benefit from risk pooling and liquidity and they
also benefit from risk alteration. The shareholders of the Originator
are able to reduce the Originator's cost of capital both because of the
economics of risk pooling and liquidity, and because of the subsidy
received from involuntary and non-adjusting creditors.
The parties to "arms-length" securitization transactions cannot,
therefore, be relied upon to sort between securitization transactions that
are driven by value creating/market perfecting benefits, and those that
are driven by rent-creation. If sorting is to occur, it must come either
from countervailing imperfections in the market, like investor risk
aversion, or from law acting on the market. The appropriate legal
response to this dynamic turns on an empirical inquiry that has not
been undertaken. If the value created by securitization is significant,
and the cost of risk alteration trivial, then a regime of freedom to
contract might be desirable. If the risk alteration effect is the dominant
reason for securitization, then such transactions should be prohibited.
Assuming that the truth lies somewhere in between, the question
becomes whether the benefits of sorting outweigh the costs. This
raises two subsidiary questions: (1) who (i.e., what institution) is in the
best position to accomplish the task of sorting; and (2) what should the
legal basis for sorting be?
II. MUDDY RULES, RISK ALTERATION AND SECTION 912

As I have discussed elsewhere,'

sorting can be conducted in the

marketplace with legislative or judicial guidance from clear legal rules
(if the permitted and proscribed conduct can be easily defined), or the
sorting can be carried out jointly by judges under muddy rules (or
standards) and by the marketplace in the shadow of judicial, standard
based, decision making. 2 Under current law, two grey areas, one

25.

See Janger, supra note 23.

26. The literature on rules versus standards is extensive. See Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 600 (1988); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42-61 (1990); Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992);
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statutory and the other judicially created, govern securitization
transactions.2 7
Both are aimed at identifying and prohibiting
transactions that are driven by risk alteration and delegate the sorting
function to judges. Section 912 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001
seeks to severely limit both opportunities for subjecting securitization
transactions to such judicial sorting.
A. FraudulentConveyance Law and the Intended as Security Doctrine:
Transparencyand Risk Alteration
The first legal grey area governing securitization is fraudulent
conveyance law,28 which seeks to ensure that the Originator receives
full value for the assets transferred to the SPV. By scrutinizing the
adequacy of consideration, when the Originator is insolvent or near
insolvency, fraudulent conveyance law ensures that creation of the SPV
does not alter the risk faced by creditors of the Originator. Under
Section 5 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA"), a
transfer can be avoided as fraudulent if the transfer was made while the
debtor was insolvent, and not for "reasonably equivalent value." '29
Section 4(a)(1) allows avoidance of intentional fraudulent transfers,3"
and Section 4(a)(2) prohibits transfers that the debtor should reasonably
have known would have left it insolvent, or with unreasonably small
capital.3 "
Fraudulent conveyance law protects the Originator's
creditors from securitizations which would have the effect of forcing
them to bear the risk associated with the Originator's business
operations, while investors in the SPV would gain the benefit.
Limiting the scope of fraudulent conveyance law would make it easier
for debtors to externalize risk.

Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89

HARv. L.

REv. 1685 (1976).
27. See infra Part II.A-II.B.
28. As discussed below, in addition to fraudulent conveyance law, securitization
transactions may be subject to challenge under a variety of veil piercing theories under
state corporation laws. The issue under both theories is the same: Did Originator
receive fair value for the assets conveyed to the SPV? For ease of exposition, I will
only discuss fraudulent conveyance law.
29.
30.
31.

UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5.
Id.at § 4(a)(1).
Id.at § 4(a)(2).
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The second grey area is the line between true sales and sales
intended as security. Under the "intended as security" doctrine, courts
invalidate transactions that function as a "clog" on a debtor's "equity
of redemption."32 The doctrine arose as a mechanism for protecting
individual debtors from overreaching creditors,33 but it has been
retained for a number of reasons. First, since it preserves equity for
the debtor, it has the secondary effect of protecting the creditors from
risk alteration as a result of such overreaching. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, the sale/loan distinction encourages financial
transparency. When a debtor enters into a sale transaction, the seller
exchanges one asset for another. Receivables are exchanged for cash.
One asset is removed from the seller's balance sheet, and another asset
arises. When a debtor enters into a sale that is really a secured loan,
the receivables are exchanged for cash, but the purchaser retains
recourse against the debtor. Three things should therefore happen on
the seller/debtor's balance sheet: (1) the receivables should be removed
from the asset column; (2) the cash should be added to the debit
column; and (3) the recourse obligation should be booked as debt.
Often, however, these transactions fall into a gap in the current
accounting standards where the recourse obligation can be ignored or
merely noted in the footnotes. 4 The recent failure of Enron shows
how manipulation of SPVs can confuse both auditors and financial
markets. 35 Thus, a sale intended as security can make it more difficult
32.

Accord Janger, supra note 23, 573; see also Grant S. Nelson, The Contract

for Deed as Mortgage: The Case for the Restatement Approach, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REv.
1111, 1141 (1998).

33. Overreaching creditors are oversecured creditors who seek to use the debtor's
default as an opportunity to both obtain repayment and seize the debtor's "equity" in
the property.
34. See ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND
EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES - A REPLACEMENT OF FASB STATEMENT No. 125,
Statement of Financial Account Standards No. 140 (Financial Accounting Standards
Bd. 2000); see also ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL
ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIABILITIES, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 125 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1996).
35. Joseph F. Berardino, Managing Partner and Chief Executive Officer, Arthur
Andersen, Remarks Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Financial Services (Dec. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.arthurandersen.com/website.nsf/content/MediaCenterBerardinoFullTestim
ony!OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).
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for other investors of the debtor to determine what the debtor owns and
how much the debtor owes.
If the transfer of assets from the Originator to the SPV is a "true
sale," it is appropriate to exclude the assets transferred to the SPV
from the bankruptcy estate of the Originator if it fails. On the other
hand, if a transfer of the assets to the SPV is deemed "intended for
security," then risk alteration and financial obfuscation are more
likely, and it makes sense to treat the securitized assets as part of the
Originator's bankruptcy estate.3 6

In sum, both of these grey areas require judges to determine
whether the dominant effect of a securitization is value creation or risk
alteration and deception.
B. Section 912: A Safe Harborfor Deceptive and Risk Altering
Securitizations
Section 9123 operates under the assumption that legal uncertainty
is bad because it is costly and chills transactions. As such, the
proposed amendments seek to eliminate both of these areas of legal
uncertainty in a wholesale fashion.
First, they attempt to limit the risk of fraudulent conveyance faced
by investors in the SPV. Subsection 1 amends Section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code to exclude from the definition of property of the
estate:
(8) any eligible asset (or proceeds thereof), to the extent that such
eligible asset was transferred by the debtor, before the date of
commencement of the case, to an eligible entity in connection with
an asset-backed securitization, except to the extent such asset (or
proceeds or value thereof) may be recovered by the trustee under
section 550 by virtue of avoidance under section 548(a) .. .

Thus, so long as the assets "transferred" to the SPV by the
Originator are "eligible assets," and so long as the SPV is an "eligible
entity," the assets transferred to the SPV are excluded from the
36. See Hill, supra note 8.
37. For a complete text of Section 912, see Appendix I, immediately following
this Article, infra pp. 319-20.
38. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 4; see also Appendix I, infra
pp. 319-20.
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Originator's bankruptcy estate, unless the transfer itself can be avoided
under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.
What is interesting about this section is what it excludes. Section
548 allows the trustee to avoid intentional and constructive fraudulent
conveyances by the debtor.39 As such, it does leave some place for
judicial sorting along the risk alteration axis, but only so long as the
bankruptcy occurs within one year of the securitization. '4 In the
absence of Section 912, the Originator's creditors would have at their
disposal all of the avoidance powers listed in Section 550.4' These
include the power to avoid transfers under Section 547,42 the power to

avoid unperfected security interests under Section 544(a),43 and most
importantly, the power under Section 544(b) to avoid any transaction
that could have been avoided by a creditor at state law as of the
moment of the bankruptcy, including state law fraudulent conveyance
actions and state law veil piercing actions." In addition, while Section
548(a) tracks the causes of action available under the UFTA at state
law, it has an unusually short statute of limitations of one year.45 Most
states have longer limitation periods,' including New York which has
a six-year statute of limitations applicable to fraudulent transfers.47

Second, Section 912 also tries to eliminate any concern that the
sale of assets to the SPV might be considered a "sale intended as

39.

See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2000).

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id.
See id. § 550(a).
See id. § 547(b).
See id. § 544(a).
See id. § 544(b).
See id. § 548(a)(1).
46. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-9A-9 (2001) (creating a ten-year statute of
limitations after transfer of real property and a six-year limitation after the transfer of
personal property in Alabama); ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 44-1009 (2001) (setting the
statute of limitations for fraudulent transfers at four years after the transfer of real or
personal property); PA. CONS. STAT. § 12-5109 (2001) (setting the statute of
limitations for fraudulent transfers in Pennsylvania at two years after the transfer of
real or personal property); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 109A § 10 (2001) (setting the
statute of limitations for fraudulent transfers in Massachusetts at four years after the
transfer of real or personal property); R.I. GEN LAWS § 6-16-9 (2001) (setting the

statute of limitations for fraudulent transfers in Rhode Island at four years after the
transfer of real or personal property).
47.

N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW

§ 273 (2001).
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security." Section 912(2) would add a new section to the Bankruptcy
Code, Section 541(f)(5), which would provide:
(5) the term 'transferred' means the debtor, under a written
agreement, represented and warranted that eligible assets were
sold, contributed, or otherwise conveyed with the intention of
removing them from the estate of the debtor pursuant to subsection
(b)(8) (whether or not reference is made to this title or any section
hereof), irrespective and without limitation of(A) whether the debtor directly or indirectly obtained or held
an interest in the issuer or in any securities issued by the
issuer;
(B) whether the debtor had an obligation to repurchase or to
service or supervise the servicing of all or any portion of such

eligible assets; or
(C) the characterization of such sale, contribution, or other
conveyance
for tax, accounting, regulatory reporting, or other
48
purposes.

Section 5(B) is the language that significantly alters the current
Under that provision, a transfer will be sufficient to remove
assets from the Originator's bankruptcy estate, even if the debtor has
an obligation to repurchase the assets. This provision creates the
possibility that the conveyance of assets to the SPV will be sales in
name only, while in substance they will be loans secured by the
"transferred" assets.
The effect of this provision is striking when it is read together
with subsection 1. Such an agreement would, in the absence of this
section, be recharacterized as a "sale intended for security," 5" and
would therefore create an unperfected security interest, avoidable by
the trustee."
As such, the purchaser would be treated as a mere
law. 49

48. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 4; see also Appendix I, infra
pp. 319-20.
49. At least insofar as it eliminates an area of legal uncertainty.
50. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (2001).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000). This is already the law with regard to
"Repurchase Agreements" as defined in Section 103 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11
U.S.C. § 559; see also In re Bevill, Bressler and Schulman Asset Mgmt. Co., 67
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unsecured creditor under state law and in the Originator's bankruptcy
case. Under Section 912, by contrast, the agreement would not just
create a perfected security interest, but would operate as a true sale,
removing the asset entirely from the Originator's bankruptcy estate.
In short, the intention of Section 912 is to ensure that any assets
conveyed to an SPV in a securitization transaction will be excluded
from the bankruptcy estate of the Originator, regardless of whether the
transaction is a true sale, a sale intended as security, or the creation of
an unperfected security interest. The effect is to create a crystalline
rule that any assets conveyed to an SPV in a securitization will be
insulated from the Originator's bankruptcy estate.
III. THE BENEFITS OF MUDDY RULES

Section 912 thus substitutes a crystalline safe harbor for the
muddy rules governing state law fraudulent conveyances and sales
intended as security. This is likely to save transaction costs. Indeed,
saying, "Section 912 will reduce transaction costs and facilitate
securitizations," rolls so trippingly off the tongue that it tempts one not
to look behind the statement to ask whether anything is being lost when
these muddy rules are abandoned. Muddy rules create uncertainty.
Uncertainty makes lawyers nervous. Nervousness in the abstract
seems bad. But one needs to ask a second question: "Nervousness
about what?" Muddy rules create uncertainty about outcomes. This
uncertainty has two related effects. First, it increases the likelihood
that a dispute, if it arises, will have to be resolved by a judge. Second,
since judicial decision-making is costly, it places a tax on transactions
that fall within the zone of legal uncertainty. Whether the costs
B.R. 557 (D.N.J. 1986). However, Section 912 would generalize this result. There

may be some perceived urgency in this regard after the decision in In re LTV Steel,
Inc., No. 00-43866, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 131 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2001).
52. Indeed, Section 912 might go further. An asset is "transfer[red]" if it is
.sold, contributed, or otherwise conveyed with the intention of removing [it] from the
estate of the debtor." Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 4; see also
Appendix I, infra pp. 319-20. Under this language, it is possible to imagine that the
mere creation of a security interest would qualify as a "conveyance," and, so long as
the security agreement provided that the intention was to remove the asset from the

bankruptcy estate, the result would be to take a security interest, unperfected outside
of bankruptcy, and leave it out of the bankruptcy estate.
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associated with judicial decision-making are beneficial will depend on
whether the potential liability relates to conduct where either judicial
sorting is necessary, or where taxation at the margin will likely deter
inefficient transactions.
Both fraudulent conveyance law and the "intended as security"
doctrine operate on the "risk alteration" or "subsidy" axis of
securitization. Both seek to ensure that a securitization will not harm
the other creditors of the Originator. Fraudulent conveyance law seeks
to ensure that the Originator receives a fair price received for any
assets conveyed,53 while the relationship between "intended as
First,
security" and risk alteration is somewhat more complex.
from
the
because assets that are sold prior to bankruptcy are excluded
debtor's bankruptcy estate, creditors have an incentive to characterize a
transaction as a sale rather than a secured loan. The "intended as
security doctrine" seeks to ensure that substance rather than form
The line is
determines the characterization of a transaction.
determined by asking: "Who has the risk of ownership of the
property?" If the benefits and risks of ownership transfer to the
purchaser, then the transaction is treated as a sale. If the benefits and
risk of ownership remain with the seller, then the transaction creates a
security interest. If the creditor retains recourse against the debtor, the
asset remains in the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Risk alteration is thus
prevented.
The second effect of the "intended as security" doctrine is to
mandate accurate disclosure of assets and liabilities. On its face, the
"intended as security" doctrine appears to have its basis in naked
paternalism clothed as equity. Individual debtors, it was feared, would
be willing to give away the farm in the future, in return for cash today.
As a modern cognitive psychologist might: put it, the debtor would
overvalue present consumption and discount the probability of default
in the future. The Chancellor's response was to invalidate "clogs" on
While such "consumer
the debtor's "equity of redemption." 5 4
protection" might make sense in the case of loans to individuals,
securitization does not deal with assets of consumer debtors. So, one
might argue, the "intended as security" doctrine loses its vitality in
commercial, arms-length transactions.
53.
54.

See Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 1, at 647.
See supra note 32.
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This "cognitive" problem in the consumer context, however, has a
parallel in the commercial context. An agency problem exists in the
corporations, which leads to the same result.5 Because many creditors
cannot adjust the interest rate that they charge to account for increased
risk, securitization benefits the shareholders, who can externalize
(place the burden of) some of the cost of a risky business strategy onto
existing creditors, who are not at the table when the securitization deal
is constructed. Thus rational shareholders (or officers) may make the
same "cognitive" mistake as irrational consumers. The intended as
security doctrine limits the effect of this agency problem because it
creates litigation risk. The salutary effect of such litigation risk may
be to force the shareholders to internalize the additional cost of a risky
strategy.
In short, what is striking about both of the muddy rules that
govern securitizations is that they force the parties to the securitization
transaction to think about the effect that the transaction will have upon
affected parties who are not in the room. Section 912, by eliminating
both muddy regimes, is likely to facilitate risk alteration.
By
eliminating Section 544(b) avoidance actions, much of the risk of
fraudulent conveyance and veil piercing actions is eliminated once a
year has passed. By characterizing virtually any "transfer" as a true
sale, securitizers can manipulate the components of a debtor's
bankruptcy estate virtually at will.

55. While few people think of corporate managers as agents of creditors, this
does not mean that an agency problem does not exist. It is important to recognize that
economists do not use the term "agency" in the same way that lawyers do. It is not
necessary for a corporate officer to be an "agent" of the shareholders in the legal

sense, for there to be an "agency" problem in the economic sense.

As Frank H.

Easterbrook has noted, the reason that shareholders are given the power to control a
corporation is that they are the residual claimants. The logic is that any action that

helps the residual claimant will increase the value of all claims against the enterprise.
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 403 (1983); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANtEL R. FISCREL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 11 (1991). This logic collapses

when the shareholders can increase the risk faced by one class of claimants, without
paying a corresponding risk premium. The shareholders, who have voting power, can
impose uncompensated risk on creditors, who do not have control of the debtor's
business strategy. This creates an opportunity for intra-firm externalities and creates
an incentive for opportunistic behavior by the residual claimant.
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IV. QUID PRO Quo?
Thus, Section 912 eliminates judicial sorting along the
subsidy/risk alteration axis. This is not necessarily a bad thing if the
result is that society benefits from more securitization related alchemy.
This is particularly true if Section 912 finds a way to replace judicial
sorting with some other form of sorting. On its face, Section 912
appears to do this. The device it uses is the definition of an "eligible
entity." An SPV is an "eligible entity" only if the securities it issues
are, at least in part, investment grade, as rated by one of the nationally
recognized bond rating agencies.
Sorting by rating agencies is, however, a curious substitute for
judicial sorting. Rating agencies care principally about two things
when they rate securities. They care first about the creditworthiness of
the underlying assets, and second about whether those assets are likely
to be swept back into the bankruptcy estate of the Originator. To
guard against this risk, they generally request an opinion of counsel
stating that the SPV is "bankruptcy remote." In other words, a lawyer
must state that it is not likely that the assets conveyed to the SPV will
be swept back into the estate of the Originator, should the Originator
fail. Under current law, whether counsel can give such an opinion
turns on whether there is fraudulent conveyance risk and on whether
the sale was a true sale or a sale intended for security. In other words,
counsel needs to look at the transaction to determine whether it is
efficient or inefficient. The opinion writer must look at the transaction
through the eyes of a judge adjudicating under a muddy standard and
offer an opinion. The threat of judicial sorting ex post creates a regime
where opinion writers sort the transactions ex ante.
If Section 912 is enacted, then most fraudulent conveyance risk
would be eliminated, and all risk from the "intended as security"
doctrine would be eliminated as well. In other words, once a rating
agency has determined that the bonds will be investment grade (i.e.,
the receivables are high quality), then the risk to the opinion writer
virtually disappears. The inquiry becomes, essentially, circular. The
effect of Section 912 will be to eliminate judicial sorting ex post and
consequently to eliminate lawyer sorting ex ante.
The second curiosity is the basis for the sorting by rating agencies.
Remember, the potential inefficiency of securitization transactions lies
in the creditworthiness of the Originator, and in the potential of the
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securitization to alter the risk faced by creditors of the Originator.
Determining whether the securities of the SPV are going to be
investment grade asks the wrong question. Instead of asking about the
creditworthiness of the Originator, Section 912 asks about the
creditworthiness of the SPV. That turns on the quality of the assets
conveyed to the SPV, not on whether such conveyance is likely to
impose costs on the creditors of the Originator.
CONCLUSION

In short, Section 912 substitutes a crystalline safe harbor for the
muddy rules that currently govern securitization transactions. While,
at first glance, it may appear that Section 912 simply shifts the sorting
function from courts to attorneys, placing the burden on them to ensure
that the transaction is not driven by risk alteration, the elimination of
judicial sorting has the effect of relieving the attorneys and rating
agencies of their own burden of reviewing the effect of the transaction
on the creditors of the Originator.
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APPENDIX I - COMPLETE TEXT OF § 912 OF S. 420
AND H.R. 333
SEC. 912. ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATIONS.
Section 541 of title 11, United States Code, is amended(1) in subsection (b), by inserting after paragraph (7), as added by this
Act, the following:
(8) any eligible asset (or proceeds thereof), to the extent
that such eligible asset was transferred by the debtor,
before the date of commencement of the case, to an
eligible entity in connection with an asset-backed
securitization, except to the extent such asset (or
proceeds or value thereof) may be recovered by the
trustee under section 550 by virtue of avoidance under
section 548(a); and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
(f) For purposes of this section(1) the term "asset-backed securitization" means a
transaction in which eligible assets transferred to an
eligible entity are used as the source of payment on
securities, including, without limitation, all
securities issued by governmental units, at least one
class or tranche of which was rated investment
grade by one or more nationally recognized
securities rating organizations, when the securities
were initially issued by an issuer;
(2) the term "eligible asset" means(A) financial assets (including interests therein and
proceeds thereof), either fixed or revolving, whether or
not the same are in existence as of the date of the
transfer, including residential and commercial mortgage
loans, consumer receivables, trade receivables, assets
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of governmental units, including payment obligations
relating to taxes, receipts, fines, tickets, and other
sources of revenue, and lease receivables, that, by their
terms, convert into cash within a finite time period,
plus any residual interest in property subject to
receivables included in such financial assets plus any
rights or other assets designed to assure the servicing or
timely distribution of proceeds to security holders;
(B) cash; and
(C) securities, including without limitation, all
securities issued by governmental units;
(3) the term "eligible entity" means(A) an issuer; or
(B) a trust, corporation, partnership, governmental unit,
limited liability company (including a single member
limited liability company), or other entity engaged
exclusively in the business of acquiring and transferring
eligible assets directly or indirectly to an issuer and
taking actions ancillary thereto;
(4) the term "issuer" means a trust, corporation,
partnership, or other entity engaged exclusively in the
business of acquiring and holding eligible assets, issuing
securities backed by eligible assets, and taking actions
ancillary thereto; and
(5) the term "transferred" means the debtor, under a
written agreement, represented and warranted that eligible
assets were sold, contributed, or otherwise conveyed with
the intention of removing them from the estate of the debtor
pursuant to subsection (b)(8) (whether or not reference is
made to this title or any section hereof), irrespective and
without limitation of(A) whether the debtor directly or indirectly obtained or
held an interest in the issuer or in any securities issued
by the issuer;
(B) whether the debtor had an obligation to repurchase
or to service or supervise the servicing of all or any
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portion of such eligible assets; or
(C) the characterization of such sale, contribution, or
other conveyance for tax, accounting, regulatory
reporting, or other purposes.

